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A network of gene regulation organized in a hierarchical and combinatorial manner is 
crucially involved in the development of the neural network, and has to be considered one 
of the main substrates of genetic change in its evolution. Though qualitative features may 
emerge by way of the accumulation of rather unspecific quantitative changes, it is reasonable 
to assume that at least in some cases specific combinations of regulatory parts of the genome 
initiated new directions of evolution, leading to novel capabilities of the brain. These notions 
are applied, in this paper, to the evolution of the capability of cognition-based human empa­
thy. It is suggested that it has evolved as a secondary effect of the evolution of strategic 
thought. Development of strategies depends on abstract representations of one’s own pos­
sible future states in one’s own brain to allow assessment of their emotional desirability, but 
also on the representation and emotional evaluation of possible states of others, allowing 
anticipation of their behaviour. This is best achieved if representations of others are con­
nected to one’s own emotional centres in a manner similar to self-representations. For this 
reason, the evolution of the human brain is assumed to have established representations with 
such linkages. No group selection is involved, because the quality of strategic thought affects 
the fitness of the individual. A secondary effect of this linkage is that both the actual states 
and the future perspectives of others elicit vicarious emotions, which may contribute to the 
motivations of altruistic behaviour.
Introduction
Most general capabilities of the human brain, 
such as language, mental self-representation, long­
term strategic thought and cognition-based empa­
thy may have evolved quite recently in the evolu­
tionary time scale, perhaps only some hundred 
thousand years ago. Mainstream explanations are 
mostly gradualistic. For instance, the evolution of 
brain capabilities is often discussed in relation to 
increases in brain size. Indeed, the theories of bi­
furcation and dynamic instabilities reveal how dis­
tinct features can gradually develop in many small 
steps without specific initiations, and it is conceiv­
able that quantitative extensions of the neural net­
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work allow for the emergence of additional func­
tions. However, there is also the possibility that 
new capabilities originate from rare specific ini­
tiating genetic changes that open up an innovative 
direction for further development. In the history 
of technology, both types of innovation are docu­
mented. For instance, in 19th century ocean traffic, 
the fast ocean clippers were mainly the result of 
quantitative changes in the construction of sailing 
vessels -  slim hulls, huge sails -  whereas steam­
ship development was dominated by qualitative 
innovations: the combination of Watt’s steam en­
gine with sea vessels; the replacement of the 
wooden by the iron hull, and of the paddle wheel 
by the screw propeller. Analogous distinctions 
may be applicable to biology: though it is not logi­
cally necessary to invoke qualitative initiating 
events to explain the evolution of novel features, 
they may be more efficient in some cases, and evo­
lution prefers efficient pathways. This may apply, 
in particular, to the evolution of specifically hu­
man brain capabilities, despite the intellectual ap­
peal of theories emphasizing processes of ‘self-or-
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ganization’ as indirectly related to, and as remote 
from specific genetic determinants as possible.
In this article I would like to discuss the ‘initia­
tion’ hypothesis in relation to networks of gene 
regulation, neural networks and their function, 
with an emphasis on cognition-based empathy as 
one of the specifically human brain capabilities.
A Main Substrate of Brain Evolution Is the 
Network of Gene Regulation Involved in 
Neural Development
The evolution of capabilities of the neural net­
work is to be related to the main mechanisms of 
evolutionary changes at the DNA level as revealed 
by molecular genetics (see Alberts et a l, 1997). 
The genome consists of nucleotide sequences cod­
ing for proteins, as well as non-coding sections. 
Within the latter, specific regulatory sequences of 
the DNA occur which bind specific regulatory pro­
teins. In turn, these bound proteins contribute, in 
a combinatorial fashion, to the regulation of tran­
scription of nearby coding sequences, thereby con­
trolling the synthesis of the corresponding protein. 
Certain regulatory proteins affect the production 
of other regulatory proteins; this hierarchical net­
work of gene regulation is capable of assuming dif­
ferent stable states characterized by different com­
binations of regulatory proteins, allowing for cell 
differentiation in the course of the spatiotemporal 
development of the organism. The spatial order is 
organized, in part, by the response of the cells to 
position-dependent morphogenetic signals, such as 
graded distributions of morphogens. Many pro­
cesses not discussed here are involved in develop­
mental regulation, pattern formation and m orpho­
genesis, including further translational as well as 
transcriptional control mechanisms, induction, sig­
nal transduction, effects of cofactors, and cytoskel- 
eton dynamics. However, a central mechanism of 
the genetic control of development is the control 
of expression of a large number of proteins by the 
binding of regulatory proteins to the regulatory 
parts of the genes (see Arnone and Davidson, 
1997). The latter can be regarded as microproces­
sors of information, responding in a combinatorial 
fashion to the set of regulatory proteins that is spe­
cific for a particular cell type, developmental stage, 
and position in the organism (see Alberts et a l, 
1997; Gierer, 1973).
This is relevant, in particular, for spatiotemporal 
regulation of the expression of proteins involved 
in axonal guidance and targeting: though the rela­
tion between genes and brain functions is an indi­
rect one, it is sets of regulatory genomic sequences 
that are instrumental in implementing appropriate 
rules of connectivity within the developing neural 
network. The network laid down in this way is 
then refined and altered by internally generated, 
as well as externally driven, activity-dependent 
processes (for review, see Gierer and Müller, 
1995). The resulting network properties, in turn, 
determine functional capabilities of information 
processing and set the stage for further modifica­
tions elicited by experience, including learning, in 
different phases of the individual organism’s life­
span.
In the course of evolution, segments of the ge­
nome are duplicated, recombined and transposed 
to new positions at widely different rates, to be 
modified and fine-tuned by subsequent mutations. 
Duplications of coding sections of genes give rise 
to families of related proteins. Duplications and 
translocations of non-coding sections may affect 
the expression of given proteins in new contexts 
of development. In this way, new directions of evo­
lution may be initiated; though immediate pheno­
typic effects on fitness are most probably small, 
they may gradually become larger by way of fur­
ther mutations in the direction of the innovative 
evolutionary pathway.
In line with these concepts, it is proposed that 
the evolution of new mental capabilities related to 
pre-existing ones is initiated, at least in some cases, 
by duplication of sections of DNA containing dis­
tinct sets of regulatory DNA sequences involved 
in brain development, in particular of those be­
longing to the upper strata of hierarchies of devel­
opmental regulation, and their introduction into a 
new context within the genome, followed by fur­
ther modification. In populations of millions, in 
the course of many thousands of generations each 
regulatory section has a chance to be introduced 
into many other contexts of the genome. In such 
a way, rare combinations with positive effects on 
genetic fitness may have a chance to initiate a new 
direction of further evolution. Widely distributed 
features of the neural network could be affected 
in this way, and novel combinations of subroutines 
of gene regulation may initiate the evolution of
new features of the neural network, leading to 
novel algorithmic capabilities on the basis of exist­
ing ones.
Evolution of Cognition-Based Empathy:
Some Major Issues
These notions will now be applied to the evolu­
tion of human cognition-based empathy. Little is 
known about the neurobiological basis of this ca­
pability, and the concepts and hypotheses dis­
cussed below cannot do justice to the subtle 
psychology of empathic emotions; they will be lim­
ited to the following aspects:
1. Human empathy is based on specifically human 
cognitive capabilities, and is a source of altruis­
tic behaviour.
2. The evolution of empathy depends on effects 
giving rise to an increase in fitness; this is pos­
tulated to occur by upgrading the quality of 
strategic thought.
3. Strategic thought depends on the representa­
tion of selves and of others in the brain, capabil­
ities that are encoded in the human genome.
4. The evolution of the capability of empathy im­
plies the linkage of representations of others 
with one’s own emotional centres.
5. This linkage may have been initiated, in evolu­
tion, by specific combinations of subroutines of 
gene regulation.
Cognitive Capabilities as a Basis of 
Human Empathy
Empathic, ‘vicarious’ emotions of a person shar­
ing, in an attenuated and modified way, the emo­
tional states of another person, are not confined 
to immediate responses to present states of others, 
such as overt pain; they include cognition-based 
participation in the future perspectives of others, 
and their emotional correlates, such as anxiety and 
hope. The development of empathy in childhood 
and its relation to cognitive development is widely 
covered by psychological research (e.g. Hoffman, 
1981; Eisenberg, 1986; Miller et al., 1991). In the 
earliest stages there are immediate responses to 
certain distress signals. Recent research demon­
strated pro-social behaviour, presumably involving 
perspective taking, by very young children from 
14 months of age. Studies by Bischof-Köhler 
(1989) suggest correlations between self-represen­
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tations, expressed as the child’s capability of recog­
nizing him- or herself in a mirror, and the capabil­
ity of empathy. Later, the child is able to realize 
that the internal states of others, including their 
knowledge and emotions, differ from his or her 
own (Wimmer and Perner, 1983). This enables him 
or her to infer false beliefs in others. Eventually, 
the capability is developed to allow assumption of 
the roles of others, the child then imagining, play­
ing and acting in accordance with their assumed 
internal states.
Whereas the mature capacity for empathy en­
compassing subtle information on the mental 
states of others is expressed only after a sequence 
of stages of cognitive and emotional child develop­
ment, and the expression of empathy is dependent 
on individual character, education, personal ex­
perience and culture, the ability for cognition- 
based empathy as such is most probably encoded, 
in an abstract manner, in genetic determinants of 
the human brain. W hether and to what extent 
“theory of mind” capabilities exist in apes is diffi­
cult to detect. Chimpanzees’ behaviours include, 
for example, food sharing and gestures of reconcil­
iation. However, it is not easy to decide, on the 
basis of behavioural studies, whether an animal is 
able to infer mental states of others, such as inten­
tions, desires, beliefs and knowledge. This is borne 
out, for instance, by a collection and controversial 
discussion of episodes suggesting deception in ani­
mals (Whiten and Byrne, 1988). Cheney and Sey- 
farth (1990) state that “chimpanzees, if not other 
apes recognize that other individuals have beliefs, 
but there is little evidence that chimpanzees recog­
nize discrepancies between their own state of mind 
and the state of mind of others. They show little 
empathy for each other and they do not teach each 
other.“ In a recent review, Povinelli and Preuss
(1995) conclude that “humans might have evolved 
a cognitive specialization in theory of mind forever 
altering their view of the social universe.“ It ap­
pears likely that cognition-based empathy is a dis­
tinct feature that has arisen in the course of human 
evolution, presumably in its later stages. Empathy 
is capable of inducing altruistic and cooperative 
human behaviour, though induction does not nec­
essarily occur and is itself subject to motivation 
and learning (Miller et al., 1991). This raises the 
question as to why and how the capability of 
human empathy could have evolved.
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Evolution generally favours egoistic behavioural 
dispositions directed toward higher reproduction 
rates for the corresponding genetic trait; coopera- 
tivity and other forms of altruistic behaviour call 
for specific explanations. One of them is “inclusive 
fitness” (Hamilton, 1964; Maynard Smith, 1964) 
accounting for cooperation between relatives shar­
ing many of their genes by common descent: a 
gene encoding behavioural dispositions for coop­
eration may spread within the population even if 
the encoded behavioural traits reduce the fitness 
of some of its carriers for the sake of others, that is 
of close relatives. Since kinship is often statistically 
correlated with common upbringing, cooperation 
based on “familiarity” may include non-relatives 
if they share features of socialization. Then there 
is the theory of “reciprocal altruism” (Trivers, 
1971) which is sustained by analysis of evolution­
ary stability of behavioural dispositions toward co­
operation on the basis of game theory (Axelrod 
and Hamilton, 1981). Cooperation at the expense 
of one’s own fitness at a given time may be moti­
vated by the expectation of cooperation from the 
partner (with oneself or one’s close relatives) in 
the future. In human populations, “indirect reci­
procity” may be based on probabilistic expecta­
tions summarizing information on a member of 
the group in the form of his or her reputation 
(Alexander, 1987).
Altruistic behaviour induced by empathy, how­
ever, cannot be generally explained in terms of kin 
selection or reciprocity. It is not restricted to kin, 
although it may be stronger among relatives than 
among others; and it can occur in many situations 
in which reciprocity would not be expected. There­
fore, empathy, especially its human, cognition- 
based form, appears to be a source of human altru­
ism that calls for an independent explanation in 
terms of evolutionary theory. I would like to sug­
gest that the capability of human cognition-based 
empathy may have evolved in close association 
with the evolution of strategic thought that, in 
turn, contributes to individual fitness and may 
compensate for reductions in fitness by disposi­
tions of altruism.
Mental Representations of Selves and Others, 
Strategic Thought, and Cognition-Based Empathy
Efficient strategic thinking depends on adequate 
representations of spatio-temporal features of the
outside world in the human brain; in addition, it 
requires good “self-representations”, of actual as 
well as possible “selves”. The latter are to be as­
sessed for emotional quality in case they should 
become real in the future, so that behavioural stra­
tegies can be developed for optimizing one’s own 
emotional wellbeing. Self-representations are a 
basic feature of human consciousness. They are 
systems’ properties of the physical state of the cor­
responding brain; and yet, it may be impossible to 
develop a complete algorithmic theory of the 
mind-brain relation (Gierer, 1983). Dynamic con­
cepts on “multiple selves” including “possible 
selves” are sustained by an impressive body of 
psychological studies (Markus and Wurf, 1987; 
Markus and Nurius, 1986).
Representation of selves requires specific capa­
bilities of the neural network for analysing its own 
content and abstracting, processing and storing 
past, present and possible future feature combina­
tions of oneself, the last to be evaluated with re­
spect to emotional desirability. These capabilities 
may have evolved by generalizing modes of analy­
sis originally concerned with forecasting external 
events, towards anticipating possible future mental 
and emotional states of the brain itself.
However, optimizing strategic thinking requires 
not only representations of possible states of one’s 
own features; it also depends on a good assess­
ment of the possible behaviour of others. Learning 
from past experience alone could lead to predic­
tions concerning their future behaviour, but such 
predictions would be relatively time-consuming 
and liable to error compared with an approach 
that makes additional use of the essential biologi­
cal similarities of human brains: the relationship 
between personal situations and emotions is ex­
pected to be generally similar for others and one­
self. Therefore, representations of others that in­
clude information on their mental features allow 
us to predict and assess their possible actions. Ade­
quate representations of others include aspects of 
how they see themselves, and others (including 
oneself) and of how they emotionally evaluate 
actual and possible situations.
For these reasons, an important contribution to 
the capability of strategic thought appears to be the 
linkage of representations of others including their 
present as well as their potential future mental 
states to one’s own emotional subsystems. Emo­
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tional states of others and their behavioural conse­
quences can then be assessed and integrated into 
one’s own strategic thought for the generation of 
behavioural dispositions. Such assessment, based in 
the first approximation on the similarity of human 
brains, can be modulated and improved by the in­
corporation of knowledge, acquired by learning, of 
differences in individual character, personal experi­
ence and socio-cultural background.
The postulated linkages of representations of 
others with one’s own emotional centre not only 
improve the quality of strategic thought with re­
spect to predicting the behavioural responses of 
others; they also support the capability of learning 
from the experience of others. These effects 
increase individual fitness. Therefore, evolution 
tends to establish such linkages. Referring to the 
hypothesis of a key role of relatively rare genetic 
changes in initiating new directions of evolution, 
it is suggested that the evolution of the capability 
for representing the features of others in the brain 
might have originated from duplications and sub­
sequent variations of genomic subroutines encod­
ing the neural connectivity underlying the capabil­
ity of self-representation. In order to give rise to 
cognition-based empathy, the representations of 
others must maintain or evolve linkages with one’s 
own emotional centres by neuronal connections 
that resemble those between self-representations 
and one’s own emotional centres; the capability of 
cognition-based empathy combining perspective 
taking and vicarious emotions could thus be en­
coded.
Most probably, the representations of selves, as 
well as of others, are widely dispersed rather than 
localized in the neural network. Prominent roles 
may be played by the prefrontal areas of the cere­
bral cortex, which are concerned with planning, 
goal-directed behaviour and other highly integ­
rating functions involving novelty, complexity and 
temporal organization (Fuster, 1985; Goldman- 
Rakic, 1988), and by limbic structures, which are 
known to be central gateways for emotions and 
are extensively interconnected with the prefrontal 
areas of the cortex; the specific role of the latter 
in emotional assessment is strongly supported by 
recent evidence (Davidson and Sutton, 1995). The 
actual neurobiological correlates of representa­
tions of selves and others in this context are not 
yet known.
Irrespective of the hypothetical details of such 
mechanisms, a secondary effect resulting from the 
connection of representations of others with one’s 
own emotional centres in the brain is that others’ 
joy, suffering, moods and, further, more subtle 
states of mind, both in present, actual and in fu­
ture, possible situations, are reflected in one’s own 
emotions. This, in turn, may lead to behaviour 
aimed at relieving pain and achieving wellbeing 
for others, ultimately for the sake of one’s own 
positive emotions; empathy induces trans-kin co- 
operativity and other forms of pro-social behav­
iour.
The Evolutionary Stability of Empathy and the 
Gene-Culture Relationship
In terms of evolutionary theory cognition-based 
human empathy increases individual fitness by up­
grading the quality of strategic thought while the 
secondary effects of empathic altruistic behaviour 
reduce fitness. Evidently, the latter effect would 
prevent the evolution of empathy if it were to lead 
to a net decrease of individual fitness. Therefore, 
it cannot have been too pronounced from the out­
set, and it may have been reduced in the further 
course of evolution by attenuation of the linkage 
between representation of others in one’s brain 
and one’s own emotional centres. However, there 
may be limits to attenuation if the positive effects 
for strategic thinking are to be maintained, and it 
may be that there are no evolutionary pathways of 
genetic changes in the neural network that would 
reduce empathy to zero within time spans consist­
ent with human evolution.
In addition, cultural mechanisms may contribute 
to the stabilization of behaviour expressing empa­
thy. The generation and transfer of information by 
cultural means sometimes imposes different, and 
often less stringent, constraints than the conditions 
of evolutionary stability of purely genetic evolu­
tion, especially with regard to features related to 
group selection (Boyd and Richerson, 1990; Ri- 
cherson and Boyd, 1992). This, in turn, suggests 
that moderate reductions of individual fitness re­
sulting from cooperative behaviour induced by 
empathy might be compensated by cultural mo­
tives and indirect benefits, such as the conformity 
reward posited by Richerson and Boyd. Such pos­
sible co-evolutionary aspects of empathy need fur­
ther studies.
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The Case for Distinct Genetic Changes Initiating 
the Evolution of Human Capabilities, Such as 
Cognition-Based Empathy
The proposed concept of self-representation 
and representation of others in the human brain 
as a basis for strategic thought as well as for empa­
thy is consistent with recent (off-mainstream) 
ideas (Povinelli and Preuss, 1995) on “important 
differences in how humans, great apes and other 
animals interpret other organisms“, suggesting 
that “at some point in human evolution, elements 
of a new psychology were incorporated into exist­
ing neural systems.“ It is emphasized that only ca­
pabilities for empathy are genetically encoded, 
whereas culture then determines in which contexts 
and for what purposes these capabilities are acti­
vated and expressed.
The hierarchical and combinatorial features of 
the network of gene regulation involved in the de­
velopment of the neural network suggest that a 
limited number of distinct genetic changes affect­
ing a few genomic subroutines may initiate an in­
novative evolution of algorithmic capabilities of 
the brain, such as cognition-based empathy. Such 
mechanisms are consistent with the notion that 
general human capabilities may have evolved 
rather recently within a short interval on the evo­
lutionary time scale. It is not claimed that the as­
sumption of rare initiating events is logically re­
quired to explain the evolution of new capabilities 
of the brain, but it is suggested that this is a most 
efficient way of generating novel algorithmic capa­
bilities in a stage of evolution where highly devel­
oped capabilities are already available for new 
combinations and modifications. Our hypothesis 
on the role of rare initiating events is in full accord 
with phenotypic gradualism: the initial effects on 
fitness of the primary genetic changes forming a 
new direction of evolution were presumably small, 
to be enhanced only in many subsequent accumu­
lating mutational steps.
A more profound understanding will require ad­
vances in developmental neurobiology, in combi­
nation with explicit theoretical models. A crucial 
issue is the indirect relationship between the order 
of the network of gene regulation involved in neu­
ral development and the order of the correspond­
ing neural network that underlies its functional 
capabilities.
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